One customer. One purchase.
Every obligation the Act creates.
Follow Meru Retail, a fictional Indian D2C brand, and Aarav Menon, one of its shoppers — from the first cookie on the homepage to a signed erasure certificate. Every screen here is a faithful mock of what DPDP Comply actually ships. Your choices carry forward through all seventeen chapters.
Hash-chained events, signed receipts, external timestamp anchoring.
What are we actually collecting?
Meru Retail's marketing team has added tags over three years and nobody kept a list. Before you can give a lawful notice you have to know what is on the page. The scanner loads the site in a real headless browser and reports what it finds.
A runtime scan opens the page, accepts nothing, and records every cookie, script and network beacon that fires anyway — including the ones that fire before any consent is given.
Launching headless browser…
Each purpose is the unit of consent, of retention, and of the ROPA record. Define it once and the banner, the privacy notice, the retention worker and the Records of Processing Activities export all stay in sync.
| Purpose | Category | Legal basis | Data | Retention | Storage |
|---|
A Data Fiduciary must give notice describing the personal data sought and the purpose for which it is to be processed. You cannot describe what you have not inventoried.
- Nothing yet — run the scan.
"Our tags change weekly."
Schedule the scan. Any new tracker that appears without a matching purpose raises a drift alert, and the cookie policy page is regenerated from the scan rather than hand-maintained.
Is this visitor a child?
Aarav opens meruretail.in. Before a single tracker fires, the widget has to resolve a question the Act treats as decisive: is this person under eighteen? Choose either path — the rest of the walkthrough adapts to what you pick.
Before processing a child's personal data a Data Fiduciary must obtain verifiable consent of the parent or lawful guardian, and must not undertake tracking, behavioural monitoring, or targeted advertising directed at children.
- Waiting for the visitor's answer.
"What happens when the child turns eighteen?"
If a date of birth was declared, a background worker expires the consent on the eighteenth birthday and re-prompts as an adult. The event is written to the audit chain as MINOR_AGED_OUT.
Asking properly
Consent under the Act must be free, specific, informed, unconditional and unambiguous — a clear affirmative action, for a stated purpose. That rules out pre-ticked boxes, bundled purposes, and a "Reject" button that is harder to find than "Accept". Toggle the settings and watch the banner and the tag signals respond.
Scripts in the analytics and marketing buckets stay inert until the matching signal flips to granted. Denied is the default state on first load, so nothing leaks in the gap before the visitor answers.
Consent must be free, specific, informed, unconditional and unambiguous with a clear affirmative action, and be limited to such personal data as is necessary for the specified purpose.
- Banner rendered. No data collected yet.
"Our shoppers read Hindi and Tamil."
The Act requires the notice be available in English or any language in the Eighth Schedule. Switch languages in the banner header — the chosen language is stored on the consent record, so you can prove which text the person actually saw.
Proof the visitor can keep
A screenshot of a banner proves nothing. The moment consent is recorded, the platform issues a signed consent receipt: a portable document stating who collected what, for which purposes, under which notice version, and how to withdraw. Signed with the project's own Ed25519 key, verifiable by anyone.
No consent recorded yet. Go back to Chapter 3 and make a choice in the banner — the receipt is generated from what you actually pick.
- The public key ships inside the receipt, so a regulator or the principal can verify it without contacting you.
- The email is masked in the receipt body — the proof does not itself become a data spill.
- Every receipt names the exact notice version displayed, linking back to the immutable notice record.
- A public verification endpoint accepts a pasted receipt and returns valid or invalid, with no login.
The Data Fiduciary bears the burden: the Data Fiduciary shall be responsible for … demonstrating that a notice was given and consent was obtained in accordance with the Act.
- Awaiting a consent decision.
What the compliance team sees
Meru's DPO opens the console. This is the same consent Aarav just gave, resolved into a record that can be searched, exported, audited and — critically — explained to someone who was not in the room.
No consent record yet — complete Chapter 3 first.
Opt-in rate is a compliance metric, not just a marketing one: a rate near 100% usually means the banner is coercing, and a rate near zero means the value exchange was never explained. The A/B testing module lets you test banner copy against both consent rate and complaint rate.
A Data Fiduciary must implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure effective observance of the Act, and remains accountable regardless of any contract with a processor.
- Awaiting a consent decision.
Can you trust your own logs?
Every consent event is sealed into an append-only chain: each row's SHA-256 hash includes the hash of the row before it. An edit anywhere breaks every link after it. Try it — edit a row below and re-run verification.
The chain fills as events occur. Complete Chapter 3 to seed it.
A hash chain proves internal consistency. It does not, by itself, prove the whole chain was not rebuilt last night. So the head of the chain is periodically anchored to an RFC 3161 timestamp authority outside your control.
| Anchored at | Chain | Seq | Head hash | Method |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026‑07‑25 04:00 IST | CONSENT_AUDIT_EVENT | 1,204,881 | 8f3c1a…d20b | RFC 3161 |
| 2026‑07‑24 04:00 IST | CONSENT_AUDIT_EVENT | 1,198,402 | 2ba77e…91f4 | RFC 3161 |
| 2026‑07‑24 04:00 IST | AUDIT_LOG | 884,113 | c0e5b2…7a3d | RFC 3161 |
The Board may direct production of records during an inquiry. Records that could have been silently edited invite the question of whether they were.
- Awaiting events.
Aarav changes his mind
Six weeks later the marketing emails have worn thin. The Act sets a hard design rule: withdrawing consent must be as easy as giving it. No login wall, no retention call, no five-step form.
Withdrawal is not just a flag on a row. The platform stops the purpose at the edge and notifies every processor linked to it, so the obligation to cease processing actually reaches the systems doing the processing.
"The Data Principal shall have the right to withdraw her consent at any time, with the ease of doing so being comparable to the ease with which such consent was given."
On withdrawal the Fiduciary must cease processing within a reasonable time, and cause its Data Processors to do the same, unless retention is required by law.
- Awaiting withdrawal.
"Show me everything you hold"
Withdrawal was the easy one. Now Aarav exercises a statutory right through Meru's privacy portal. The hard part is not the form — it is verifying he is who he claims to be before handing over a file of personal data.
| Right | Section | What the platform does |
|---|---|---|
| Access | S.11 | Assembles a machine-readable export: consent history, purposes, processors the data was shared with, and the identities of any further recipients. |
| Correction & completion | S.12 | Routes the change to the record owner, then propagates it to processors that received the earlier value. |
| Erasure | S.12(3) | Deletes or anonymises, minus anything a law requires you to keep — and records which exemption was relied on. |
| Nomination | S.14 | Stores a nominee who may exercise the rights on death or incapacity, with the relationship on record. |
| Grievance | S.13 | Opens a grievance thread against the named Grievance Officer, with its own escalation ladder — see the next chapter. |
A Data Principal has the right to obtain a summary of personal data being processed and the processing activities undertaken, and the identities of other Fiduciaries and Processors with whom it has been shared.
The Act itself sets no numeric deadline for responding to a rights request — that is left to the DPDP Rules. The platform therefore tracks a target you configure, defaulted for you, rather than asserting a statutory number on your behalf.
- Awaiting a request.
Someone has to answer
A request that lands in a shared inbox is a request that gets missed. Meru's Grievance Officer works a queue with a visible clock, an escalation ladder that fires without anyone remembering, and a full communication trail per request.
| Request | Type | Principal | Status | Time to target |
|---|
- T − 5 daysREMINDERAssigned handler is nudged. Nothing leaves the team yet.
- T − 2 daysESCALATEDOwners and admins are alerted; the request is pinned to the top of the queue.
- T + 0OVERDUE_FINALStatus flips to OVERDUE automatically and the DPO is notified. The flip is written to the audit log — you cannot quietly reset the clock.
- Next reportBREACH_LOGGEDRecorded in the compliance report as a missed target, with the delay in days.
The Act requires you to publish the business contact of the person who answers questions about processing. The platform hosts that page, versions it, and logs every change of officer.
- Officer
- Rohan Sharma
- Contact
- grievance@meruretail.in
- Published at
- /meru-retail/grievance-officer
- Last change
- 14 Mar 2026 logged
- 14 Mar 2026Officer changedM. Iyer → R. Sharma. Notice auto-patched on 4 documents.
- 02 Jan 2025Officer appointedM. Iyer named at go-live.
A Data Fiduciary must publish the business contact information of a Data Protection Officer or a person able to answer questions about processing, and provide an effective mechanism to redress grievances.
- Awaiting a request from Chapter 8.
The notice nobody rewrites by hand
A privacy notice that drifts from the purpose registry is worse than none — it is documented evidence of a mismatch. Meru's notice, cookie policy and terms are generated from the same registry the banner reads, versioned on every change, and hosted on Meru's own domain.
| Document | Version | Published | Languages | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Privacy Policy | v4 | 12 Jun 2026 | EN · हिं · த | Live |
| Consent Notice (shown in banner) | v7 | 12 Jun 2026 | EN · हिं · த | Live |
| Cookie Policy (from scanner) | v11 | 25 Jul 2026 | EN · हिं | Live |
| Terms of Service | v3 | 02 Jan 2026 | EN | Live |
| Data Retention Policy | v2 | 02 Jan 2026 | EN | Live |
| Children's Data Policy | v2 | 14 Mar 2026 | EN · हिं | Live |
| Grievance Redressal Policy | v3 | 14 Mar 2026 | EN | Live |
| Data Processing Agreement (template) | v1 | 02 Jan 2026 | EN | Template |
When the Grievance Officer changed in March, every document naming the old officer was auto-patched and re-versioned. Aarav's consent record still points at notice v6 — the text he actually saw — not at today's v7.
- 12 Jun 2026 · v7New purpose added: Personalised recommendationsExisting consents flagged REQUIRES_RECONSENT for that purpose only. The other purposes stay valid — you do not re-prompt for everything.
- 14 Mar 2026 · v6Grievance Officer changedAuto-patched across 4 documents. Logged as NOTICE_AUTO_PATCHED.
- 02 Jan 2026 · v5Retention shortened on marketing data730 → 365 days. Retention worker recalculated 22,908 expiry dates overnight.
- Privacy Centre on privacy.meruretail.in — a customer-facing hub, not a vendor page.
- TLS provisioned automatically for the custom domain.
- Meru's logo, colours and typography on the banner, the portal and every email.
- A public trust page summarising posture, live document versions and the named officer.
The notice must be presented in clear and plain language, with the option to access it in English or any language in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution.
- Documents generated from the live purpose registry.
- Every version retained and addressable.
- Consent records pinned to the version displayed.
- Officer change propagated automatically.
Where the data actually goes
Meru's shopper data touches nine external systems on three continents. Two obligations bite here: you may only engage a processor under a valid contract, and you may not transfer to a country the Central Government has restricted.
| Vendor | Role | Country | Purposes | DPA | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Google Analytics 4 | Processor | 🇺🇸 US | Analytics | Active → 2027 | 3/10 |
| Meta Ads | Joint controller | 🇺🇸 US | Marketing | Active → 2027 | 6/10 |
| Razorpay | Processor | 🇮🇳 IN | Payments | Active → 2028 | 2/10 |
| Delhivery | Processor | 🇮🇳 IN | Fulfilment | Active → 2027 | 2/10 |
| Freshdesk | Processor | 🇮🇳 IN | Support | Expires in 41 days | 3/10 |
| Klaviyo | Processor | 🇺🇸 US | Marketing | Active → 2027 | 5/10 |
| AWS Mumbai | Processor | 🇮🇳 IN | Hosting | Active → 2029 | 1/10 |
Each vendor carries its DPA document, a risk score from the last audit, its own DPO contact, and the list of purposes it is linked to — which is what makes the downstream erasure signal in Chapter 7 possible at all.
| Destination | Recipient | Data | Basis | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🇺🇸 United States | Google LLC | Device ID, page events | Consent (Analytics) | Permitted |
| 🇺🇸 United States | Klaviyo Inc. | Email, order history | Consent (Marketing) | Permitted |
| 🇸🇬 Singapore | Meru APAC Pte | Order records | Intra-group | Permitted |
| 🇮🇳 India | AWS ap-south-1 | All | Hosting | Domestic |
Each purpose in the registry generates a ROPA entry — data categories, principal categories, recipients, retention, sensitivity, cross-border flag. Reviewed on a cycle, snapshotted on every review, exportable as CSV or PDF for an auditor.
A Data Fiduciary may engage a Processor only under a valid contract, and remains responsible for compliance in respect of any processing undertaken on its behalf.
Transfer outside India is permitted except to such country or territory as the Central Government may … notify as restricted.
- 7 processors registered with DPAs on file.
- Expiry alert raised 41 days ahead.
- Transfers checked against the notified list.
Forgetting on schedule
The most commonly ignored obligation in the Act, because it requires deleting data nobody asked you to delete. Once the purpose is served and no law requires retention, the data must go — including at your processors.
| Purpose | Retention | On expiry | Due in 30 days | Actioned this year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Order fulfilment | 8 years | Manual review | 0 | 0 |
| Site analytics | 395 days | Anonymise | 4,120 | 38,004 |
| Marketing & retargeting | 365 days | Hard delete | 1,877 | 21,455 |
| Personalised recommendations | 180 days | Hard delete | 2,904 | 44,190 |
| Support transcripts | 3 years | Manual review | 61 | 1,208 |
| Security & fraud | Statutory | Exempt — retain | — | — |
Anonymise and delete are different obligations with different business consequences. Analytics keeps its value once identifiers are stripped; a marketing profile does not, so it is destroyed outright.
Where consent is withdrawn or the purpose is no longer being served, the Fiduciary shall erase the personal data, and cause its Processors to erase it, unless retention is necessary for compliance with law.
- Expiry computed per purpose, per principal.
- 1,595 actions taken unattended last night.
- Every action sealed into the audit chain.
- Statutory-retention purposes exempted explicitly.
The bad Tuesday
A misconfigured storage bucket at a logistics partner exposes 12,400 delivery addresses. From this moment, two clocks start and a lot of people ask for documents. The register is the difference between a controlled disclosure and a scramble.
- Title
- Partner storage bucket exposed delivery manifests
- Discovered
- 21 Jul 2026, 09:14 IST
- Contained
- 21 Jul 2026, 11:47 IST
- Severity
- HIGH
- Affected
- 12,400 data principals
- Data types
- Name, delivery address, phone, order ID
- Projects
- storefront, mobile-app
- Root cause
- Processor misconfiguration (Delhivery)
- 21 Jul · 09:14DetectedReported by external researcher. Incident opened; severity set HIGH. Both clocks start here — CERT-In and DPDP.
- 21 Jul · 09:22 T+8 minCERT-In notified"Data breach" is a reportable cyber incident under the CERT-In Directions, with a 6-hour window from noticing. Filed via the designated point of contact; acknowledgement reference stored.
- 21 Jul · 09:31Board of India intimatedInitial intimation filed without delay on becoming aware. Acknowledgement reference stored on the incident.
- 21 Jul · 11:47ContainedBucket ACL corrected; partner credentials rotated; access logs preserved.
- 21 Jul · 16:20Affected principals notified12,400 notices sent in EN and हिं, describing the breach, its likely consequences, the measures taken, and how to contact the Grievance Officer.
- 23 Jul · 18:00Detailed report to the BoardFull particulars, remediation and findings filed within the window set by the DPDP Rules.
- OpenVendor audit & DPA reviewDelhivery risk score raised 2 → 6; out-of-cycle audit scheduled; DPA amendment requested.
This is the point most breach registers miss. A data breach at an Indian company is simultaneously a DPDP event and a CERT-In cyber incident, under different statutes, to different authorities, on different clocks. Miss either and the other one does not save you.
| Track | Authority | Trigger | Window | This incident |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CERT-In | CERT-In | Reportable cyber incident incl. data breach / data leak | 6 hours of noticing | Filed T+8 min |
| DPDP — Board | Data Protection Board | Personal data breach | Form & timing per the Rules | Filed T+17 min |
| DPDP — principals | Each affected principal | Personal data breach | Form & timing per the Rules | 12,400 notified |
Reporting is the visible part. The Directions also impose continuous obligations that only matter on the day you need them — which is this day.
- 180-day log retention, within India. Logs for the incident window were available because they were already being kept — not recovered afterwards.
- Clock synchronisation to NIC / NPL time servers, so the timeline above is defensible rather than approximate.
- Designated point of contact registered with CERT-In, kept current and versioned like the Grievance Officer.
- Evidence preserved at containment, before remediation destroyed the access logs.
One button produces what an inquiry asks for, assembled from records that already existed rather than reconstructed after the fact.
- Incident record with the full timeline and every status change, attributed and timestamped.
- Copies of both notifications — to the Board and to principals — with delivery receipts.
- The exact list of affected principals and the data categories involved.
- The processor's DPA, its audit history, and the risk score before and after.
- Audit-chain extract covering the incident window, with its anchor proof.
In the event of a personal data breach, the Data Fiduciary shall give the Board, and each affected Data Principal, intimation of such breach in such form and manner as may be prescribed.
Directions issued under section 70B(6) of the IT Act 2000 require specified cyber incidents — including data breach and data leak — to be reported to CERT-In within 6 hours of noticing.
The form, manner and timing of DPDP breach intimation are set by the DPDP Rules, not by a number in the Act. The CERT-In 6-hour window is fixed and comes from a different statute. The platform tracks both as separate configurable tracks and dates every filing, so the record speaks for itself.
- Immutable timeline from detection to closure.
- All three notification tracks recorded separately.
- CERT-In filed inside the 6-hour window, evidenced.
- Linked back to the processor and its DPA.
When the rules get heavier
Meru has grown. The Central Government may notify any Data Fiduciary as a Significant Data Fiduciary, and that designation adds obligations no amount of good banner hygiene will satisfy: an India-resident DPO answerable to the Board, an independent auditor, and impact assessments done before processing starts rather than after something goes wrong.
The Act lets the Government weigh volume and sensitivity of data, risk to data principals' rights, and impact on sovereignty, electoral democracy, State security and public order. Designation is not something you opt into — but it is something you can see coming.
A DPIA is not a form you file. It is the record of a decision: here is what we intend to process, here is what could go wrong for the people involved, here is what we changed as a result. Toggle the mitigations and watch residual risk move.
- Processing
- Personalised recommendations from browse history
- Principals
- All storefront visitors, incl. minors
- Data
- Browse history, wishlist, device ID
- Assessor
- Priya N. · DPO
- Reviewed
- 25 Jul 2026
- Next review
- 25 Jan 2027
- Firm
- Kaveri Assurance LLP
- Engaged
- 02 Feb 2026
- Last audit
- 14 Jun 2026
- Findings
- 3 open 11 closed
- Officer
- Priya Nair
- Reports to
- Board of Directors
- Also
- Grievance point of contact
- Published
- Yes
| Model | Fed by purpose | Affects a person? | Human review | DPIA |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Recommendation ranker v4 | pur_personalisation | Content shown | Not required | Done |
| Fraud scoring v2 | pur_necessary | Order can be refused | Mandatory | Done |
| Support triage LLM | pur_support | Routing only | Not required | Due |
A Significant Data Fiduciary shall appoint a Data Protection Officer … based in India who shall be responsible to the Board of Directors, appoint an independent data auditor, and undertake periodic Data Protection Impact Assessment and periodic audit.
Designation is by Government notification under S.10(1) — it is not a threshold you cross automatically at some number of records. The checker above estimates exposure against the statutory factors; it does not tell you that you are an SDF.
Getting things actually signed
Look back at what the last fourteen chapters produced: a DPA that must be executed with each processor, a guardian who must be verifiably identified, a principal whose identity must be checked before data is released, and a DPIA that must be signed off. Every one of those ends in a signature — and today, every one of them leaves the platform to get it.
| Artefact | Who signs | Today | With signing built in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Data Processing Agreement Ch 11 · S.8(2) | Vendor's signatory | Exported, emailed, signed elsewhere, re-uploaded as a PDF nobody verifies | Routed for signature, countersigned, returned to the vendor record — status moves DRAFT → ACTIVE on its own |
| Verifiable parental consent built Ch 2 · S.9(1) | Parent or guardian | Email OTP — proves control of a mailbox, not identity | Aadhaar eSign — a signature bound to a verified identity, which is a materially stronger reading of "verifiable". Try both paths in Ch 2 → |
| Rights request identity built Ch 8 · S.11 | Data principal | Upload a scan of a government ID, which you then have to store and protect | DigiLocker — you get the issuer-verified assertion without ever holding the document. Try both paths in Ch 8 → |
| DPIA sign-off & audit Ch 14 · S.10(2) | DPO, auditor, Board | A name typed into a field | An attested signature on a specific version of a specific document |
| Breach report Ch 13 · S.8(6) | DPO | Filed, attribution by login | Signed filing, dated, in the evidence pack |
- Aadhaar eSign — an electronic signature under the IT Act's Second Schedule, delivered through a CCA-licensed eSign Service Provider. Bound to a verified identity, which is what makes it useful for guardian consent.
- Digital Signature Certificate — a token-based DSC from a licensed Certifying Authority, for signatories who already hold one.
- Electronic signature with audit trail — click-to-sign with IP, timestamp, and a hash of the exact document version. Weaker, but appropriate for low-risk internal attestations.
- Stamping and stamp duty — handled by the same providers where the instrument requires it.
The IT Act 2000 gives legal recognition to electronic signatures and provides that a contract shall not be deemed unenforceable solely on the ground that electronic form was used.
The IT Act's First Schedule excludes certain instruments from electronic execution — negotiable instruments other than cheques, powers of attorney, trusts, wills, and contracts for sale or conveyance of immovable property. None of them arise in a compliance workflow, but the exclusion is worth knowing before promising "sign anything".
Does the app actually obey?
Everything so far records what Aarav agreed to. None of it stops Meru's own backend from doing something else. The data sits in Meru's database, and an engineer with a psql prompt can do as they please. So the honest question a technical buyer asks is: what actually enforces this?
A control that costs a developer extra keystrokes is a control that gets skipped under deadline. So the SDK is written so that checking is shorter than not checking.
// One principal, one purpose if (await dpdp.allows({ externalId: user.id }, "marketing")) { await sendCampaignEmail(user); } // The case that actually bites — filter before a bulk send const sendable = await dpdp.filterAllowed(allUsers, (u) => u.id, "marketing"); await esp.send(sendable);
- Fails closed. If the gate is unreachable the SDK denies — not being able to establish that processing is permitted is a reason to stop, not to continue.
- Cached both sides, so a check costs less than the branch you would have written anyway.
- Withdrawal is immediate. Withdrawing drops the cached snapshot, so the very next check reflects it.
- Never a bare boolean. Every answer carries a reason, so a refusal is actionable and a support ticket is answerable.
This is the sentence that changes the conversation with a regulator. Not "we hold 48,219 consents" — a claim about paperwork — but "the application asked 4.2 million times and was refused 380,000 times", a claim about behaviour, with counts to back it.
| Purpose | Checks | Allowed | Refused | Top reason for refusal |
|---|
A gate only governs the code that calls it. The layer above it is reconciliation — comparing what consent permits against what the world actually observed.
The cookie scanner in Chapter 1 is this same idea pointed at the browser. This is it pointed at the server.
A Data Fiduciary shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure effective observance of the provisions of this Act.
Under S.8(2) the Fiduciary remains responsible for any processing done on its behalf, whatever the contract says. This platform supplies the measure and the evidence. You remain the Fiduciary. That boundary is in the docs and the contract, not just this slide.
Everything, on one page
Seventeen chapters, one shopper, one platform. Here is the full surface — including the parts that never appear in a demo but decide whether your security team signs off.
- SSO — SAML 2.0 and OIDC, per organisation, with domain-based routing.
- SCIM 2.0 — automatic user provisioning and deprovisioning from your IdP.
- MFA — TOTP with recovery codes, enforceable org-wide.
- Custom roles — granular permissions beyond Owner / Admin / Viewer.
- REST API — scoped keys, IP allow-lists, rate tiers, per-request logging.
- Webhooks — signed delivery with retries for consent, rights and breach events.
- Multi-tenant — organisations, projects, isolated keys and documents per project.
- Admin console — tenant oversight, impersonation with audit, restricted-country list.
- Consent analytics — opt-in by purpose, by geography, by notice version.
- Banner A/B testing — variants measured on consent rate and complaint rate.
- Compliance reports — rights volumes, targets met, retention actions, breaches.
- Audit log — every administrative action, hash-chained and exportable.
| Section | Obligation | Where you saw it |
|---|---|---|
| S.5 | Notice: data sought, purpose, how to withdraw, how to complain | Ch 1, Ch 10 |
| S.6(1) | Free, specific, informed, unambiguous consent | Ch 3 |
| S.6(4) | Withdrawal as easy as giving consent | Ch 7 |
| S.6(6) | Cease processing on withdrawal, including at processors | Ch 7, Ch 12 |
| S.8(2) | Processors engaged only under valid contract | Ch 11 |
| S.8(4) | Technical and organisational measures | Ch 5, Ch 6 |
| S.8(6) | Breach intimation to the Board and to principals | Ch 13 |
| S.8(7) | Erasure when purpose is served or consent withdrawn | Ch 12 |
| S.8(9) | Published contact for the DPO or responsible person | Ch 9 |
| S.9 | Verifiable parental consent; no tracking or targeted ads at children | Ch 2 |
| S.11 | Right to access information about processing | Ch 8 |
| S.12 | Right to correction, completion, updating and erasure | Ch 8 |
| S.13 | Right of grievance redressal | Ch 9 |
| S.14 | Right to nominate | Ch 8 |
| S.16 | Cross-border transfer, restricted-country model | Ch 11 |
| S.10 | Significant Data Fiduciary: India-based DPO, independent auditor, DPIA | Ch 14 |
| Beyond DPDP | ||
| IT Act 70B(6) | CERT-In cyber incident reporting, 6-hour window; 180-day logs | Ch 13 |
| IT Act 3A | Electronic signature: DPA execution, guardian consent, attestations | Ch 15 |
Run this walkthrough against your site: point the cookie scanner at your domain, and the first three chapters become a real inventory instead of a demo.